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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
facts;26 therefore, the opinion is not superfluous and the
declaration is admitted on the basis of necessity. 7  The
trier of fact should not be deprived of the declaration, for
what it is worth, even though in the form of an opinion,
if it meets all the requirements of an admissible dying
declaration.
LAuRENCE M. KATz
Recovery For Physical Injury Resulting From
Fright Without Impact
Battalla v. State'
Infant plaintiff was placed in a chair lift at Bellayre
Mountain Ski Center by a state employee who failed to
secure and properly lock the belt intended to protect the
occupant. As a result of this negligence the child became
frightened and hysterical upon descent and suffered "con-
sequential injuries." Plaintiff brought suit in the Court of
Claims of New York.2 The State's motion to dismiss the
claim was denied.3 The State appealed, and the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, reversed the order and dismissed
the claim.' Claimant appealed, and a divided Court of
Appeals, in overruling a previous decision to the contrary,
held that the claim stated a cause of action.5
Indeed the declarant when he made the declaration might not have
been able to state the facts because of his physical condition.
27 5 WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra, n. 24:
"The theory of that rule [opinion rule] is that, wherever the witness
can state specifically the detailed facts observed by him, the infer-
ences to be drawn from them can equally well be drawn by the jury,
so that the witness' inferences become superfluous. Now, since the
declarant is here deceased, it is no longer possible to obtain from him
by questions any more detailed data than his statement may contain,
and hence his inferences are not in this instance superfluous, but
are indispensable."
110 N.Y. 2d 237, 176 N.E. 2d 729 (1961).
'17 Misc. 2d 548, 184 N.Y.S. 2d 1016 (1959). New York has a general
waiver of immunity statute which provides that the tort liability of the
state is to be determined in accordance with the same rules of law as
applied to an action against an individual or corporation. N.Y. CT. CL.
Act § 8; see also MoK-uNEY, N.Y. CONST. Art. 6, § 23. See Note, Liability
Of Municipal Corporations Under The State's Statutory Waiver Of Tort
Immunity, 20 Md. L. Rev. 353 (1960).
8 The Court of Claims was of the opinion that Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.
Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), which had held there can be no
recovery for injuries, physical or mental, incurred by fright negligently
induced, should be overruled.
'11 A.D. 2d 613, 200 N.Y.S. 2d 852 (1960). The court stated that the
case was controlled by Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., ibid.
'The claim stated that the plaintiff suffered "severe emotional and
neurological disturbances with residual physical manifestations .... "
Battella v. State, supra, n. 1.
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Cases wherein damages for mental disturbance have
been sought fall generally into one of four classifications:
(1) Where mental anguish alone without any phy-
sical injury is caused by a negligent, but not willful,
act6 courts have denied recovery except in rare in-
stances.7 Recognition of this established rule was ac-
corded by the Maryland Court of Appeals by dictum
in Green v. Shoemaker.8
(2) Where defendant's negligence was directed at,
and caused injury to, a third person, the general rule
is that plaintiff can not recover for a mental or emo-
tional disturbance or for bodily injury resulting there-
from in the absence of a contemporaneous impact.'
The usual reason given is that, as to plaintiff, no duty
was breached by defendant. Thus, in Resavage v.
Davies," the Court of Appeals denied recovery for
nervous shock and resulting physical injury to a
mother who had witnessed her two daughters struck
and killed by defendant's negligently operated car.
(3) Whenever damages are sought by plaintiff for
mental disturbance accompanying a physical injury
sustained as a result of some negligent conduct on the
part of defendant, the courts have uniformly allowed
compensation as a valid element in damages.11
(4) However, where the physical harm complained
of results solely from the mental disturbance, as in
68 M.L.E. 57, Damages, § 64; 25 C.J.S. 550, Damages, § 64.
" Principally, negligent transmission of a telegraph message outrageous
on its face, Russ v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E. 2d
681 (1943) ; negligent mishandling of corpses, Klumback v. Silver Mount
Cemetery Ass'n, 242 App. Div. 843, 275 N.Y.S. 180 (1934) ; and foreign
matter in food, Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 125 Misc. 835, 211 N.Y.S. 582
(1925).
8111 Md. 69, 77, 73 A. 688 (1909): "[I]t may be considered as settled,
that mere fright, without any physical injury resulting therefrom, cannot
form the basis of a cause of action." See also the Court's statement in
Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 106 (1883). For an extensive treatment of
the subject see Annot., "Right to recover for mental pain and anguish
alone, apart from other damages", 23 A.L.R. 361 (1923), supplemented in
44 A.L.R. 428 (1926) and 56 A.L.R. 657 (1928).
.8 M.L.E. 60, Damages, § 67, fn. 33; 52 Am. Jur. 417, Torts, § 70; 25
C.J.S. 554, Damages, § 67; 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 312, com-
ment (e).
10199 Md. 479, 86 A. 2d 879 (1952) ; RESTATEMENT, supra, n. 9, was cited
and qualifiedly approved.
1- Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 106 (1883) : "And while it is true, the
law cannot value, and does not compensate for mental pain or suffering
when the act complained of causes that alone, yet when it is connected
with, and follows as a natural consequence of, a material wrong or injury,
it is a legitimate element of damage. . . . " 8 M.L.E. 57, 58, Damages,§§ 63, 65; 15 Am. Jur. 593, Damages, § 176; 25 C.J.S. 549, Damages, § 63.
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the Battalla case, there is a sharp conflict in the au-
thorities. In fact, one leading legal reference asserts
that "[T]he authorities are in a state of dissention
probably unequaled in the law of torts.'1 2 The division
of the Court in the Battalla case indicates the diverg-
ence of views as to what is or should be the law.
Presence or absence of any "physical impact" has given
rise to the jurisdictional cleavage. If plaintiff can prove
impact, all jurisdictions will allow recovery, other neces-
sary elements being present. But when there is no show-
ing of an instrumentality of defendant, the courts are
divided.13
Courts have been reluctant to allow recovery without
some visible and apparent infliction of physical injury by
the defendant because of the following four considera-
tions: (1) lack of precedent; (2) speculative nature of
damages; (3) lack of proximate cause; (4) public policy
and administrative problems arising out of fraudulent
litigation. 4
Yet, these objections to recovery have been met and
surmounted many times by courts and legal writers." The
argument that a court has no precedent to follow is hardly
a "make-weight" argument today since it is now a minority
of jurisdictions which deny recovery.'6
52 Am. Jur. 399, Torts, § 55. As late as 1949 it was said of the New
York law on the subject (psychic injury) that it was a "complex admix-
ture of the conservatism of the older English case law and the liberalism
of present day psychiatry, all intertwined with a considerable dash of
native aberrational variation." McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability
in New York, 24 St. Johns L. Rev. 1, 3 (1949).
'sFor recitals of cases on both sides see: Bohlen and Polikoff, Liability
in New York for the Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbance,
32 Col. L. Rev. 409, fn. 2 (1932); McNiece, supra, n. 12, pp. 14 and 16,
fns. 40 and 43; 52 Am. Jur. 427, fns. 8, 9, Torts § 79; 25 C.J.S. 556, Damages,
§ 70a. The American Law Institute has, subject to a caveat regarding
reliability of the evidence, disapproved the necessity of impact for re-
covery, 2 RESTATEMENT, TOaRS (1934) § 436(2).
4 It has been suggested that the problem has been complicated by the
difficulty of both the legal and medical professions to understand the inter-
relationship between the emotions and physical reactions thereto. See the
excellent and exhaustive discussion by Smith, Relation of Emotions to
Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193
(1944) and Smith and Solomon, Traumatic Neurosis in Court, 30 Va. L.
Rev. 87 (1943).
Prosser, for example, has said it is "threshing old straw" to deal with
them, with the possible exception of the danger of vexatious suits and
ficticious claims. PRossm?, ToRTs (2d ed. 1955) § 37, 176-177.
18 See the analytical reasoning of the court in Chiuchiolo v. New England
Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930) presenting a very con-
vincing argument against lack of precedent; it has been said that the
argument of "no precedent" is no reason at all. If it were, then every case
of the first instance would be decided against the party invoking the new
1962] BATTALLA v. STATE
The contention that assessment of damages is entirely
too speculative" is often expressed as one element of the
broad policy argument to be discussed later, and, indeed, it
can hardly stand alone. An immediate answer to this con-
tention is that these same courts have always allowed re-
covery for mental disturbance where mental suffering ac-
companies physical injury; certainly that added factor does
not make easier the task of equating suffering to pecuniary
terms."i
The third reason for denying plaintiff relief - lack of
proximate cause - is one which has bothered the courts
considerably. Since breach of duty by defendants toward
plaintiff is a necessary element in establishing the tort,
it was natural for the courts to seize upon causation and
find the physical consequences arising from fright too re-
mote, i.e., defendant had no duty to guard against conse-
quences of the type of which plaintiff is complaining.' 9
Modern medical evidence is directly opposed to this notion.
The overwhelming view is that emotional distress can
cause both mental and physical disorders in the "reason-
ably prudent man."20 Whether the injury has followed the
shock naturally, and whether such shock is the reasonable,
rule of law or new application of an established rule. The result would
be to put an end to growth of the law through judicial decision. Throck-
morton, Damage8 for Fright, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 260, 274 (1921).
3. To this effect see Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind.
App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900) and Perry v. Capital Traction Co., 32 F. 2d
938 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
isupra, n. 11. A recent English case, Schneider v. Eisovitch, 1 ALL E.R.
169 (1960), presented two difficult questions, one of which concerned
damages. While driving with defendant on a holiday in France, plaintiff
was rendered unconscious and her husband killed due to the defendant's
negligence in smashing the car into a tree. When plaintiff regained con-
sciousness in the hospital and was told of her husband's death, the shock
of that information caused serious physical consequences; her other in-
juries were mild in comparison. The court allowed recovery stating:
"The fact that the defendant by her negligence caused the death of
the plaintiff's husband does not give the plaintiff a cause of action
for the shock caused to her, but the plaintiff having a cause of action
for the negligence of the defendant may add the consequences of shock
caused by hearing of her husband's death when estimating the amount
recoverable on her cause of action." (175)
The case is noted in 23 Mod. L. Rev. 317 (1960) and 76 L.Q. Rev. 187 (1960).
For an interesting discussion of a mathematical formula for calculating
damages for pain and suffering see Note, 1960 Wash. U.L.Q. 302.
19 Typical of this line of decisions are: Ward v. West 'Jersey & S.R. Co.,
65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900) ; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y.
107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Miller v. Baltimore & 0. S.W. R. Co., 78 Ohio St.
309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908); Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224
Pa. 13, 73 A. 4 (1909). Often the courts reasoned that mental disorders
and the consequences could not be considered proximate results because
they were lacking in tangibility and dependent upon the individual
pecularities of the injured party.
1o Smith, suipra, n. 14, 217.
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natural result of defendant's negligence would seem to be
questions of fact for the jury. Courts have been criticized
for failing to distinguish between fright which is merely
the necessary link in the chain of causation 2 and fright
alleged as the injury itself.2
Broadly speaking, public policy, and more narrowly,
difficulties of judicial administration, including fear of both
fraudulent and voluminous litigation are perhaps the only
realistic objections to denying relief where there has been
no impact. This was aptly expressly by Holmes: "[I]t is
an arbitrary exception, based upon a notion of what is
practicable, that prevents a recovery for visible illness
resulting from nervous shock alone. '23 The impact seems
to be regarded as the guaranty of trustworthiness for the
claim. Yet, what constitutes impact is not at all clearly or
consistently stated by the decisions,24 and the injury there-
by sustained may be feigned as easily as where there is no
impact, according to the court in the Battalla case.25
Criticis of the public policy objection have been an-
noyed by the often advanced argument for refusing to
grant redress on grounds that to do so might increase litiga-
tion. They argue that courts are created to dispense
justice.26 Many courts allowing recovery in no-impact
cases argue that it is harsh to deny recovery in all cases
21 Cf. Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
22,Bohlen, The Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence
Without Impact, 50 U. Pa. L. Rev. 141, 152-153 (1902). "The doctrine of
Mitchell v. Railway that since fear negligently caused is not actionable,
consequences of such fear are not compensable, is a complete non sequiter
devoid of legal vitality"; Smith, supra, n. 14, 211.
2 Homans v. 'Boston Elevated Ry. Go., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902)
(refusing recovery). The leading case in Massachusetts is Spade v. Lynn
& B.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), where the court recognized
the public policy argument as the ground for denying recovery. The court
said: "It would seem, therefore, that the real reason for refusing damages
sustained for mere fright must be something different [than lack of proxi-
mate cause], and it probably rests on the ground that in practice it is im-
possible satisfactorily to administer any other rule." (89)
It is most interesting that among the decisions from the courts requir-
ing impact, such forces as inhalation of smoke [Cf. Morton v. Stack, 122
Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) ], dust in the eye [Porter v. Delaware L. &
W.R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906)] and the slightest of blows -
slight electrical shock - [Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144.
56 A. 2d 89 (1948)] have all been regarded as sufficient to substantiate
"impact." One of the best examples of the length to which courts will go
to find impact in a meritorious case is one cited in the Battalla case.
Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N.Y.S. 914 (1897),
wherein plaintiff was hit on the head by a small light bulb which fell from
an overhead lamp in defendant's car in which plaintiff was a passenger.
Recovery was allowed for a miscarriage brought by the shock resulting
from the injury.
- 10 N.Y. 2d 237, 176 N.E. 2d 729 (1961).
Smith, supra, n. 14, 197.
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merely because an occasional non-meritorious claim might
succeed.27
One answer to this contention of the minority is that
the flood of litigation not only has not materialized in those
jurisdictions which hold that neither impact nor "injury
from without" is necessary to make harm from psychic
stimuli actionable," but, on the contrary, the reported
cases reveal that the volume of litigation has been heaviest
in those states denying recovery.2 9
Thus, even the public policy objection has been exten-
sively and persuasively challenged, and courts, as in the
Battalla case, are gradually abandoning it in favor of what
is now a clearly majority view allowing recovery where
plaintiff would have an otherwise valid cause of action
except for the element of impact. Maryland, in relation
to other jurisdictions, was among the early adherents to
the modern view. The leading case is Green v. Shoe-
maker" where plaintiff sued to recover damages for in-
juries to both her property and person caused by the negli-
gent blasting of rocks by the defendants in the vicinity of
her house. In holding that plaintiff could recover for the
subsequent physical injury resulting from fright and nerv-
ousness stimulated by defendants' wrongful acts, the Court
of Appeals discussed the objections of causal connection
and expediency, and, while careful to limit its holding as
to proximate cause to this case, nevertheless clearly recog-
nized that fright can be a natural consequence of defen-
dants' negligence.3 1 On the question of expediency, the
27 Note the pointed comment of the Maryland Court of Appeals: "[T]he
argument from mere expediency cannot commend itself to a Court of
justice, resulting in the denial of a logical legal right and remedy in
all cases because in some a fictitious injury may be urged as a real one."
Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688 (1909) (quoted by the
court in the principal case). See In particular the language in Chiuchiolo
v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540, 543 (1930),
a case of first impression in that jurisdiction, where recovery was allowed.
21 Smith, supra, n. 14, 211, fn. 47.
2 McNiece, supra, n. 12, 31. A reason for this may be the extensive
exceptions constructed by these courts where they feel justice demands
that recovery be had in spite of the lack of impact. On the other hand
it must be recognized that the inducement for settlements which this
situation presents may be a reason for the failure of litigation to reach
the appellate level in those jurisdictions allowing recovery. The New York
lawmakers in 1936 attempted to overrule the Mitchell case by legislation
which failed to be enacted. Much information on the entire problem,
however, was made available by the Studies Relating to LiabilitV for
Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 1936 Report of N.Y. Law Revision
Committee, Legal Doc. No. 65(E). Information regarding increased litiga-
tion is found in this report.
-11l Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909).
8 Id., 79-80.
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Court unmistakably asserted that plaintiff will not be
denied a remedy on the broad basis of public policy.32
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals, in Tea Company
v. Roch 33 reaffirmed that damages could be recovered for
physical injury caused by fright or shock. In that case the
manager of a store sent to a nervous woman customer a
package containing a dead rat instead of the item ordered.
In both the Green and Roch cases defendant's negli-
gence was directed toward the plaintiff. Bowman v.
Williams34 presented a slight factual variation. There,
plaintiff was standing at a window in his house when he
saw the defendant's negligently operated truck crash into
the basement below him. He suffered a nervous shock re-
sulting in illness because of his fright and his alarm for
the safety of his children who were in the basement.
Recovery was allowed, the Court reasoning that there was
no basis to differentiate the fear caused plaintiff for him-
self and for his children "because there is no possibility
of division of an emotion which was instantly evoked by
the common and simultaneous danger of the three."35
In the 1950 Term the Court of Appeals twice had oppor-
tunity to reaffirm the principle of recovery for consequen-
tial damages occurring from fright without impact. The
first case was Mahnke v. Moore,36 which allowed recovery
to a five year old illegitimate child against the executrix
of her deceased father who had maintained a wife and
child in New Jersey and a home in Salisbury, Maryland,
for his paramour and the plaintiff. Decedent killed the
girl's mother with a shotgun, keeping the body in the house
with himself and the child for six days. Subsequently, he
committed suicide in the plaintiff's presence, drenching
her with his blood.37 While decedent's wanton and willful
conduct distinguishes the case from those under general
discussion, nevertheless, the Court took the opportunity to
recognize recovery for harm arising from fright.
A case decided three months to the day after the
Mahnke case, State v. Baltimore Transit Co.,"5 arose when
plaintiff's intestate was standing inside the lobby of a store
in which he was supervising installation of plate glass
windows. A truck, standing near the curb loaded with
Supra, n. 27.
"160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931).
164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
Id., 403; Of. Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A. 2d 879 (1952).
"197 Md. 61, 77 A. 2d 923 (1951).
"The main point in the ease - whether a child could recover in an
action of tort against her parent - was noted in 12 Md. L. Rev. 202 (1951).
197 Md. 528, 80 A. 2d 13 (1951).
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plate glass was struck on the street side by a passing street-
car. The declaration averred that intestate died from a
heart attack induced by shock from seeing and hearing the
crash and from concern for the possible financial loss
(rather than fear of physical impact) he might have sus-
tained as a substantial owner of the glass company. Apply-
ing the test stated in Green, the Court denied plaintiff's
claim and held that under the circumstances the shock to
decedent ought not to have been contemplated by defen-
dant as a natural and probable consequence."
These cases have followed the guiding principle ex-
pressed in the concluding portion of the Green opinion:
"It will be for the Court in future cases of this char-
acter, as in all other cases where the questions of proxi-
mate cause and legally sufficient evidence arise, to
permit no recovery except [where plaintiff would have
an otherwise valid cause of action but for the lack of
impact] while denying none upon the ground of mere
expediency, where these principles logically require
the submission of the case to the jury."4 0
This "rallying note" of the Maryland Court of Appeals
has met with approval from several authorities.4 It is said
that if proper emphasis is placed on instructing juries, i.e.,
if the court is careful to stress the fact that negligence is
not proved unless it appears from a preponderance of the
credible evidence that defendant's conduct has created an
unreasonable and foreseeable risk of causing injurious
psychic reactions in one who is possessed with average
health and resistance to injury by such stimuli, there will
be few successfully prosecuted spurious claims.42
With the Battalla decision, New York joins the ma-
jority of American jurisdictions in allowing recovery for
physical injuries caused by fright resulting from defen-
dant's negligence even though there was no concurrent
physical impact. It is submitted that this is the correct
view, and as previously noted, has been the law in Mary-
land for a number of years. As medical knowledge of the
19 Id., 537. The primary consideration of the Court in sustaining the
demurrer was that the declaration stated that decedent substantially
feared for injury not to himself, but for the loss of personal property. The
Court refused to extend this far the general doctrine of recovery for con-
sequences of fright. Cf. Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A. 2d 879
(1952).
'
0Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 83, 73 A. 688 (1909). Emphasis added.
"Smith, supra, n. 14, 302-306; Bohlen and Polikoff. supra, n. 13, 417-418.
12Ibid.
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emotional makeup of man continues to increase, and
society becomes more and more sophisticated, the minority
view may well disappear altogether. Such is the path
of the law toward justice - particularly tort law. Man's
increased knowledge of his own complexity and the ever
changing socio-economic pattern are indications that the
law will continue to grant recovery today where it would
not yesterday, tomorrow where it will not today.
If such be the case, inquiry might be made as to whether
Maryland, one of the fore-sighted jurisdictions in allow-
ing recovery without impact, will open the last door in this
area of negligence and grant recovery when the act com-
plained of causes mental anguish alone without any demon-
trable physical injuries. The precise point appears not to
have been raised. Therefore, we turn to the cases previ-
ously mentioned for guidance. There is forceful dictum
in both the Green and Sloan cases recognizing the general
rule denying recovery.43 In Bowman v. Williams the
Court, through Judge Parke, cites BOHLEN to this effect,"
and goes on to say: "if a party suffers an injury, as loss of
health, of mind, or of life, through fear of safety for self,
a recovery may be had for the negligent act of an-
other. . . . ",4' The injury is defined as: "some clearly
apparent and substantial physical injury, as manifested by
an external condition or by symptoms clearly indicative of
a resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state. '46
The Court of Appeals as late as the Mahnke case in 1951
quoted this language, and the following year in Resavage
the Court stated it was not disposed to extend the doctrine
of the Bowman case.47 Furthermore, we have seen that re-
covery was denied in State v. Baltimore Transit Co.,4"
where property damage primarily caused the fear.
In view of the definition of "physical injury" adopted
by the Maryland Court in this line of cases, it might be
argued that the Court is not ready to depart from the
generally accepted view denying recovery for mental an-
guish alone. On the other hand, these cases present a
curious blending of strict language with liberal results
where the alleged injury was the natural and probable
Supra, ns. 8, 11.
4 " 'No recovery is allowed for mere fright because fright is not of itself
such an injury as must be shown to maintain an action for negligence....
164 Md. 397, 400-401, 165 A. 182 (1933).
4Id., 401. Emphasis added.
41 Supra, n. 44, 404. Emphasis added.
41 Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 487, 86 A. 2d 879 (1952).
- 197 Md. 528, 80 A. 2d 13 (1951). See also supra, n. 39.
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result of defendant's negligence. Therefore, one may argue
that the door is not firmly closed in Maryland to recovery
for mental anguish alone, where such disturbance is pro-
longed and amounts to a substantial injury in a medical
sense.
WILLIAM H. PRICE II
Railroad Rights Of Way - Types Of Interests Acquired
Maryland and Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co.'
The plaintiff brought ejectment for recovery of land
used by the defendant as a railroad right of way. The strip
of land in controversy ran through land owned by the
plaintiff, and had been continuously used by the defendant
and its predecessors in title for railroad purposes from
1880 to 1958, at which time the defendant ceased all rail-
road operations over the land and removed the rails and
ties therefrom. The defendant railroad had no documen-
tary evidence of title, but contended that it had acquired
title in fee simple absolute by adverse possession. The
plaintiff proved a good paper title to the land and con-
tended that the defendant railroad had acquired at most
an easement by prescription in the right of way which
it abandoned by ceasing operations and removing its ties
and rails from the land. The Court of Appeals, affirming
the judgment of the lower court, held that the defendant
had acquired only an easement by prescription, which it
lost by abandonment.
The effect of a railroad's acts of abandonment depend
on the nature of the estate held by the railroad. If the
interest of the railroad is construed to be an easement,
an incorporeal interest, the railroad has only a right to the
use of the land and has no corporeal ownership in the land
itself.2 An easement can be extinguished by abandonment
1224 Md. 34, 166 A. 2d 247 (1960).
ORichfield Oil Corp. v. Railroad Co., 179 Md. 560, 20 A. 2d 581 (1941) -
an easement acquired by grant in a right of way held not to give a railroad
the right to prevent servient landowner from laying pipes below the sur-
face. See also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Breckenridge, 60 N.J.L. 583, 38 A.
740 (1897). In Michigan Central R. Co. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 292
Mich. 373, 290 N.W. 833 (1940) an easement acquired .by prescription in a
railroad right of way held not to carry with it any title to minerals under
the surface of the right of way. Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. American
1962]
